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I n response to a Committee for Human Rights inquiry related to the targeted killing of an alleged al Qaida operative in Yemen, the United States asserted: 
The Government of the United States respectfully submits that inquiries related to 
allegations stemming from any mil itary operations conducted during the course of an 
armed conflict with AI Qaidado not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur. 
AI Qaida and related terrorist networks are at war with the United States . 
Despite coalition success in Afghanistan and around the world, the war is far from 
over. The AI Qaida network today is a multinational enterprise with operations in 
more than 60 countries.l 
• Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. 
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This assertion of the existence of an armed conflict between al Qaida and the 
United States was both dear and emphatic, specifically rejecting the proposition 
that the killing was governed by human rights norms. It also represents what many 
believe is a radical theory of law: that an armed conflict can exist between a State 
and a transnational non-State entity.2 
In no location has this latter proposition been more contested than in Afghan-
istan. Although al Qaida may very well operate in over sixty countries around the 
world , the reality is that almost all the US military effort directed against that en-
emy has occurred in Afghanistan, where much of that effort has been intertwined 
with the effort to defeat the Taliban armed forces. Because ofthe contiguo us na-
ture ofthese operations, most scholars and lawof armed co nflict (LOAC) experts 
have asserted from the outset of Operation Enduring Freedom that operations 
directed against al Qaida in Afghanistan are subsumed within the broader armed 
conflict in Afghanistan. Accordingly, they reject categorically the suggestion that 
there was, or is, in Afghanistan a distinct armed conflict between the United 
States and al Qaida.3 Instead, operations directed against al Qaida were initially 
just a component of the broaderinternational armed conflict between the US-led 
coalition and the Taliban regime, and thereafter of the non-international armed 
conflict between the Kharzai government and its coalition backers and the rem-
nants of the Taliban. 
But if the premise asserted in the US response excerpted above is valid-that an 
armed conflict does exist between the United States and al Qaida-the question of 
the nature of that conflict in Afghanistan is arguably more complex. By staking out 
a new category of armed conflict, what I have labeled in previous articles as trans-
national armed conflict, the United States created the potential to treat the contig-
uous conflicts in Afghanistan as distinct. 
Such a theory of conflict bifurcation has potentially profound consequences. If 
there was and is only one armed conflict in Afghanistan, then rights and obliga-
tions related to al Qaida operatives must be analyzed under the regulatory regime 
related to that broader conflict. This would impact a wide array of legal issues, 
ranging from status of detainees, transferability and command responsibility to ju-
risdiction related to criminal sanction for violation of the LOAC. If, in contrast, the 
conflict between the United States and al Qaida occurring in Afghanistan is treated 
as distinct from the conflicts related to the Taliban, a far more uncertain legal 
framework would dictate a distinct package of rights and obligations vis-a.-vis al 
Qaida. This framework would be, at best, composed of general LOAC principles, 
perhaps supplemented by policy extension of conventional LOAC provisions.4 
This article will analyze the two primary impediments to recognizing such a bifur-
cated conflict theory. The first of these is related to recognition in the context of an 
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international armed conflict-that in such a context al Qaida is properly and ex-
clusively treated as a militia or volunteer group associated with the Taliban armed 
forces. The second is related to recognition in the context of a non-international 
armed conflict-that unless al Qaida is an element of the insurgent forces fighting 
against the Kharzai government, operations conducted against al Qaida cannot be 
characterized as armed conflict but must instead be characterized as extraterrito-
rial law enforcement. 
A theory of bifurcated armed conflict is concededly unconventional. Even if 
such a theory is viable in the abstract, it is particularly problematic in relation to the 
conflict in Afghanistan. This is because of the unavoidable reality that unlike the 
type of " one off" operations exemplified by the Predator strike that generated the 
Department of State assertion above, operations in Afghanistan directed against al 
Qaida are geographically and often operationally contiguous with those directed 
against the Taliban. Further complicating the theory is that operations conducted 
by al Qaida were, and are often are, intertwined with those conducted by the 
Taliban. However, these complicating realities only highlight the ultimate ques-
tion: does all this mean that the legal character of the armed conflicts themselves 
must be contiguous? It is precisely because the United States has asserted the exis-
tence of a distinct armed conflict with al Qaida that this question must be critically 
considered. 
Transnational Armed Conflict: Has Reality Outpaced Legality? 
Defining the nature of the armed conflict against al Qaida-if there can be such an 
armed conflict-is obviously critical to this analysis. As I have asserted in previous 
articles,S the traditionally understood law-triggering paradigm that evolved from 
the development of Common Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Conventions proved 
insufficient to respond to the need for battlefield regulation of counterterror com-
bat operations.6 These operations, particularly those conducted in response to the 
attacks of September 11 , 2001 reflect the reality that the basic regulatory frame-
work of the law of armed conflict must be triggered by any armed conflict. Because 
this is the critical predicate for the application of a bifurcated conflict theory to Af-
ghanistan, this section (reproduced with light edits from my prior article, 
"Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Armed Conflict: The Need to Recog-
nize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict"7) will explain the underlying rationale 
for a transnational, or any, armed conflict theory. 
The "either/or" law-triggering paradigm of Common Articles 2 and 38 proved 
generally sufficient to address the types of armed conflicts occurring up until 9/1 1. 
However, this fact no longer justifies the conclusion that no other triggering 
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standard should be recognized. Instead, as the events since 9/11 have illustrated so 
convincingly, such recognition is essential in order to keep pace with the evolving 
nature of armed conflicts themselves. The prospect of an unregulated battlefield is 
simply unacceptable in the international community, a fact demonstrated by the 
response to the conflict in Lebanon.9 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether it 
is best to continue to try and fit the proverbial square "armed conflict" peg into the 
round "Common Article 3" hole, or whether the time has come to acknowledge 
that the essential trigger for application of basic LOAC principles is just armed con-
fli ct, irrespective of the enemy or the location. 
The stress on the existing paradigm oflaw of war application reflected in the di-
verging conclusions of both the DC Circuit and the Supreme Court in the Hamdan 
case is in no way fatal to the ability of the law to adapt to the necessities of the 
changing nature of warfare. All law is adaptive, but this is particularly true with re-
gard to the LOAC, a conclusion illustrated by the fact that this law has endured for 
centuries. This area of international legal regulation has been historically resilient 
precisely because the law has always responded to the changes in the nature of war-
fare . Perhaps more importantly, these responses have been implemented in a man-
ner considered credible by States and the armed forces called upon to execute 
military conflicts. 
It is essential that the applicability of the principles of the laws of war-principles 
that operate to limit the brutality of war and mitigate the suffering of victims of 
war-not be restricted by an overly technica1 legal triggering paradigm. Accord-
ingly, the ongoing evolution in the nature of warfare requires acknowledgment 
that any armed confli ct triggers the foundational principles of the laws of war. If 
this outcome is achieved by characterizing such military operations as "'Common 
Article 3" conflicts that trigger the hwnane treatment obligation plus additional 
customary LOAC principles, the regulatory purpose of the law can be achieved. 
However, because Common Article 3 conflicts have become generally synony-
mous with internal conflicts, it is more pragmatic to expressly endorse a hybrid cat-
egory of armed conflict: transnational armed conflict. to 
The recognition of this "hybrid" category would not render Common Articles 2 
or 3 irrelevant. Instead, these articles would continue to selVe as triggers for appli-
cation of the treaty provisions to which they relate. But this new category would be 
responsive to the rapidly changing nature of warfare, a change that creates an in-
creased likelihood that States will resort to the use of combat power to respond to 
threats posed by non-State armed entities operating outside their territory. Such 
armed conflicts justify a more precise interpretation of the de facto conditions that 
trigger the foundational principles of the laws of war, supporting the conclusion 
that any de facto armed conflict selVes as such a trigger. Common Articles 2 and 3 
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would then selVe to trigger layers of more defined regulation in some ways redun-
dant to, and in other ways augmenting, these principles. This "layered" methodol-
ogy will ensure no conflict falls outside the scope of essential baseline regulation, 
while preselVing the technical triggers for more detailed regulation required by ap-
plication of specific treaty provisions. 
This bifurcated methodology of distinguishing between treaty provisions per se 
and the principles providing the foundation for these treaty provisions was an es-
sential aspect of the first major international war crimes trial since the advent of 
Common Articles 2 and 3. In the seminal decision defining the jurisdiction of the 
first international war crimes tribunal since World War II , Prosecutor v. Tadic,ll the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICfY), an ad hoc war 
crimes court created by the United Nations Security Council to prosecute alleged 
war criminals from the conflict that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, 
relied on a similar methodology. The Tribunal was able to sustain many war crimes 
allegations only by extending to the realm of non-international armed conflict fun-
damental principles of the laws of war derived from treaty articles applicable only 
to international anned con llicts. 12 According to this seminal decision, the require-
ments for application of individual criminal responsibility under Article 3 of its 
Statute (vesting the Tribunal with competence to adjudicate violations of the laws 
or customs of war) were that "(i) the violation must constitute an infringement of a 
rule of international humanitarian law" and "( ii) the rule m ust be customary in na-
ture or, if it belongs to treaty law, the required conditions must be met .... "13 Ac-
cordingly, the Tribunal relied on this methodology to fill a regulatory gap essential 
to establish individual criminal responsibility in relation to the anned conflict, the 
exact same logic that supports a further reliance on this methodology to regulate 
transnational armed conflicts. 
The pragmatic logic of adopting an ipso facto application of these fundamental 
principles to any armed conflict suggested in the Tadic ruling has also been at the 
core of US military policy for decades. It also provided the ratio decidendi for the 
Hamdan majority holding that the principle of humane treatment applied to the 
armed conflict between the United States and al Qaida. The Hamdan majority en-
dorsed a modified version of the Common Article 2/3 "either/or" paradigm. The 
scope of international armed conflict defined by Common Article 2 was left intact. 
However, instead of endorsing the intra-State qualifier to the alternate "type" of 
armed conflict, the Court concluded that the term "non-international" as used in 
Common Article 3 operates in juxtaposition to international armed conflicts, and 
therefore covers all armed conflicts falling outside the scope of Common Article 2. 
Accordingly, the Court detennined that a non-international anned conflict 
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includes the traditional category of internal armed conflicts, but also extraterrito-
rial armed conflicts between a State and non-State forces. As Justice Stevens noted: 
The Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that common article 3 
does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being "'international in 
scope,'" does not qualify as a "'conflict not of an international character.'" That 
reasoning is erroneous. The term "conflict not of an international character" is used 
here in contradistinction to a conflict between nations. So much is demonstrated by 
the "fundamental logic [of] the Convention's provisions on its application." Common 
article 2 provides that "the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war 
or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties." High Contracting Parties (signatories) also must abide by all 
terms of the Conventions vis-a-vis one another even if one party to the conflict is a 
nonsignatory "Power," and must so abide vis-a-vis the nonsignatory if "the latter 
accepts and applies" those terms. Common article 3, by contrast, affords some 
minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the Conventions, to 
individuals associated with neither a signatory nor even a nonsignatory "Power" who 
are involved in a conflict "in the territory of" a signatory. The latter kind of conflict is 
distinguishable from the conflict described in common article 2 chiefly because it does 
not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not). In context, then, the 
phrase "not of an international character" bears irs literal meaning. 14 
This interpretation of the scope of Common Article 3 was the essential predicate to 
the Court's holding that the procedures established by the President for the mili-
tary commission violated the laws of war. It is also thoroughly consistent with the 
view that all situations of armed conflict require regulation, the view that has moti-
vated US military policy for decades. 
Recognition that combat is an endeavor that must trigger an effective regulatory 
framework is derived from a long-standing history of self-imposed regulatory 
codes adopted by professional armed forces. As is suggested by A.P. V. Rogers in his 
book Law on the Battlefield,15 prior to the development of the legal "triggering 
mechanisms" controlling application of this regulatory framework, anned forces 
did not appear to consider "conflict typing" as an essential predicate for operating 
within the limits of such a framework. While it is true that throughout most of his-
tory this framework took the form of self-imposed limits on warrior conduct,16 
these limits provided the seeds for what are today regarded as the foundational 
principles of the laws ofwar. 11 Thus, the pragmatic military logic reflected in both 
the Hamdan decision and the Department of Defense law of war policy is deeply 
rooted in the history of warfare. 
This history undoubtedly includes examples of combat operations conducted 
by the regular armed forces of States against non-State armed groups prior to the 
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development of Common Article 3. These operations ranged from colonial expe-
ditions to what would today be characterized as "coalition" operations, such as the 
multinational response to the Boxers in China. In his book Savage Wars of Peace, 18 
Max Boot provides several examples of such combat operations conducted by the 
armed forces of the United States prior to the Second World War, ranging from the 
conflict against the Barbary Pirates to the punitive expedition against Pancho Villa. 
Armed forces executing such operations must have invoked what today would be 
characterized as the principle of military necessity, asserting the authority to take 
all measures not forbidden by international law necessary to achieve the prompt 
submission of their opponents. However, these forces must have also respected 
what would today be regarded as the principle of humanity, as understood in his-
torical context. 19 While the nature of the constraint on the conduct of these opera-
tions may have been understood more in terms of "chivalry" and less in terms of 
law,21) the basic premise that runs through this history to the contemporary battle-
field is that combat operations trigger a framework of regulation necessary for dis-
ciplined operations. Today, this framework is best understood not in terms of a 
chivalric code, but in terms of compliance with the principles of necessity, human-
ity, distinction and the prohibition against inflicting unnecessary suffering.21 
It is, of course, improper to assert that the pre-1949 history of military opera-
tions supports a conclusion that armed forces regarded such operations as trigger-
ing legal obligations. On the contrary, the international legal character of the laws 
of war in relation to contemporary warfare was based primarily on treaties that ap-
plied to conflicts between States. This point is emphasized by Professor Green in 
his book Tile Contemporary Law of Armed Conflia: 
Historically, international law was concerned only with the relations between states. AI; 
a result, the international law of armed conflict developed in relation to inter-state 
conflicts was not in any way concerned with conflicts occurring within the territory of 
any state or with a conflict between an imperial power and a colonial territory.22 
However, this history does suggest that the seeds that grew into the foundational 
principles of the contemporary laws of war extended to the realm of internal armed 
conflict by the Tadic ruling and applied to all US military operations by way of pol-
icy were derived from these internal military codes. Indeed, the fact that the con-
temporary laws of war find their origins in the practices of armed forces is also 
highlighted by Professor Green: "the law of armed conflict is still governed by those 
principles of international customary law which have developed virtually since 
feudal times .. .. "23 It therefore seems significant that armed forces did not histori-
cally qualify application of these internal codes of conflict regulation on the 
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character of the armed conflict. Nor can it be legitimately asserted that armed 
forces bound by such internal codes were employed exclusively in the realm of 
State-versus-State conflict. While this may have been the most common type of 
their combat operations, the history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also 
include military engagements falling outside this category.24 
Nonetheless, the historical context of the range of combat operations engaged 
in by regular armed forces during this critical period of leg a! development is signif-
icant when assessing appropriate scope of application of the contemporary princi-
ples of the laws of war. This history supports the inference that regular armed 
forces historically viewed combat operations--or armed conflict-as an ipso facto 
trigger for principles that regulated combatant conduct on the battlefield. This his-
tory is also instructive in exposing the fact that this "basic framework" concept was 
severely strained during the years between the First and Second World Wars. This 
strain was exacerbated by the fact that the scope of the emerging treaty-based regu-
latory regime was strictly limited to "war," which was understood in the classic 
terms of a contention between States.25 
In this regard, it also seems relevant that even Common Article 2 was a response 
to a perceived failure of the traditional expectation that anned forces would apply a 
regulatory framework derived from either the laws and customs of war or internal 
disciplinary codes when engaged in "war" between States.26 The rejection of "war" 
as a trigger for application of the laws of war during inter-State conflicts in favor of 
the "armed conflict" trigger was an attempt to prevent what one might understand 
as "bad fai th avoidance" of compliance with the customary standards related to the 
jus it! belloP The qualifier of "international" was, as indicated in the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) Commentary, an effort to emphasize that spe-
cific provisions ofthe Geneva Conventions were triggered by armed conflicts con-
ducted under State authority.28 However, as that same Commentary indicates, it is 
the "armed conflict" aspect of military operations that distinguish such activities-
and the law that regulates them-from the wide range of government activities not 
involving the application of combat power by armed forces. It is therefore thor-
oughly consistent with the purpose and history of the Geneva Conventions to place 
principal emphasis on the existence of armed conflict when assessing the appropri-
ate trigger for the foundational principles reflected in those and other law of war 
treaties. 
This general concept-that the need to provide effective regulation of de facto 
armed conflicts warrants resort to foundational principles reflected in treaties that 
are technically inapplicable to a given conflict-was also endorsed by the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v. Tadic,2'l the 
Tribunal held that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed 
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fo rce between States or protracted armed violence between governmental au-
thorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."30 
Of course, because the question before this Tribunal dealt with application of the 
laws of war to international and/or internal armed conflict, or a combination 
thereof, the significance of this language is primarily related to these traditional 
categories of armed conflict.3l What was far more sign ificant about this decision 
was the recognition that non-international armed conflicts trigger a regime of 
regulation more comprehensive than only humane treatment. In ruling o n the 
obligations applicable to participants in such non-international armed conflicts 
that provide a basis for ind ividual criminal responsibili ty, the Tribunal looked 
beyond the h umane treatment mandate of Common Article 3. In addition to this 
obligation , the T ribunal concluded that many of the fundamental rules related to 
the methods and means of warfare applicable in international armed conflicts 
had evolved to apply as a matter of customary international law to non-interna-
tional armed conflicts.32 While the Tribunal noted that this evolution did not re-
sult in a "mechanical transfer" of rules from one category of armed conflict to the 
other, this ruling clearly encompassed what are characterized by many sources as 
the foundat ional principles of the law of war.33 According to the ruling, these 
principles 
cover such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities. in particular from 
indiscriminate attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property. 
protection ofall those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities. as well as 
prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of 
certain methods of conducting hostili ties.34 
The wisdom of the Tadic judgment recognizing the necessity of extending prin-
ciples originally associated with international armed conflicts into the realm of 
non-international armed conflict logically extends to both internal and transna-
tional armed conflicts. Indeed, there seemed to be virtually no hesitation among legal 
scholars and diplomatic officials for demanding application of these principles to 
the recent conflict in Lebanon.35 Obviously, the alternate was unthinkable-that 
intense combat operations could fall beyond the scope of any legal regulation. Nor 
would application of the Hamdan ruling satisfy the perceived necessity to regulate 
such a conflict, as that ruling in no way addressed application of principles regulat-
ing the methods and means of warfare. Instead, the reaction to the conflict indi-
cated an emerging international expectation that participants in such conflicts-
and especially State fo rces-would be legally bound to comply with a range oflaw 
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of war principles intended to mitigate the suffering inflicted by combat operations. 
This evolution is achieving the imperative proposed below by Professor Roberts: 
[IJn anti-terrorist military operations, certain phases and situations may well be 
different from what was envisaged in the main treaties on the laws of war. They may 
differ from the provisions for both international and non-international armed conflict. 
Recognising that there are difficulties in applying international rules in the special 
circumstances of anti-terrorist war, the attempt can and should nevertheless be made 
to apply the law to the maximum extent possible.36 
In short. the logic animating the Department of Defense law of war policy, first 
extended to the realm of internal armed conflicts by the Tadic Tribunal. had been 
further extended to the realm of transnational armed conflicts. This evolution es-
sentially treats the foundational principles of the law of armed conflict as a layer of 
regulation upon which more comprehensive treaty regimes are built. In so doing. it 
addresses the pragmatic necessity of regulation of de facto anned conflicts, while 
preserving the continuing significance of the Common Article 2 applicability 
criteria. 
The Contiguous Conflict Dilemma: 
Does Any Association Create a Unified A rmed Conflict? 
Acknowledging that certain military operations conducted by the United States 
against al Qaida trigger basic LOAC principles does not in and of itself mandate a 
bifurcated conflict approach to Afghanistan. Instead, the viability of a distinct con-
flict theory vis-a.-vis al Qaida mandates analysis of whether the facts related to op-
erations in Afghanistan render such operations under this category or under the 
broader category of the armed conflict against the Taliban. This analysis must then 
turn on the relationship between al Qaida in Afghanistan and the Taliban. 
The LOAC, specifically Article 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). specifically addresses the status of 
militia or volunteer corps personnel associated with a State party to an interna-
tional armed conflict. That article provides that so long as certain conditions are 
satisfied. such personnel are to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture. sug-
gesting that their status is no different from that of members of the armed forces . 
This in turn suggests that such militia and volunteer corps personnel are essentially 
connected to the international armed conflict triggering application of the conven-
tion and Article 4. 
This provision provides the strongest basis to assert a unified armed conflict 
theory for Afghanistan. Indeed. this is the conventional approach to addressing the 
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conflict classification issue related to al Qaida. The logic of this unified conflict the-
ory is quite simple: Article 4 provides a basis to treat militia or volunteer corps per-
sonnel as prisoners of war; this suggests that such personnel are connected to the 
international armed conflict triggering Article 4; accordingly, their treatment pur-
suant to Article 4 indicates that their operations must be within the context of the 
broader international armed conflict. 
While this logic is certainly appealing, it has unquestionably been undermined 
by the emergence of a transnational armed conflict theory. Prior to this develop-
ment in the law, the presumption that armed groups operating in association with 
a State party to a conflict were part of that international armed conflict was conclu-
sive, because no alternate theory of armed conflict could apply to such groups. 
However, if it is conceptually possible that such groups can be involved in a distinct 
armed conflict with the State party opposing the forces with which they are associ-
ated, this presumption can no longer be considered conclusive, but is instead 
better understood as rebuttable. 
It therefore seems more appropriate to treat al Qaida personnel operating in Af-
ghanistan in association with the Taliban as presumptively part of the international 
armed conflict between the United States and Afghanistan. Pursuant to this pre-
sumption, the status and treatment of captured al Qaida personnel would be pur-
suant to Article 4A(2 ) of the GPW: if they met the express qualifica tion 
requirements of that article they were prisoners of war; if they did not they were ci-
vilians who had taken part in hostilities (with all the targeting and liability conse-
quences that flow from such participation). Was there, however, a legitimate basis 
to treat this presumption as rebutted? Answering this question requires consider-
ation of the underlying purpose and meaning of the "associated militia" provision 
of the GPW. 
Article 4A(2) of the GPW was developed for a very clear purpose: to ensure that 
individuals figh ting on behalf of a party to an international armed conflict who met 
certain qualification conditions could claim the protections of prisoner of war sta-
tus. The JCRC Commetltary to this provision indicates that the primary source of 
disagreement among delegates to the drafting conference was the treatment of par-
tisan and resistance groups in occupied terri tories. However, one aspect of the de-
velopment of this provision seems dear: there is no disagreement that any 
organized group claiming the benefit of Article 4 must be fighting on behalf of a 
State party. According to the Commetltary 
[iJt is essential that there should be a de facto relationship between the resistance 
organization and the party to international law which is in a state of war, but the 
existence of this relationship is sufficient. It may fmd expression merely by tacit 
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agreement, if the operations are such as to indicate clearly fo r which side the resistance 
organization is fighting.31 
Thus, while such a relationship need not take the form of a fo rmal agreement or 
declaration, it is clear that the militia must be operating on behalf of the State. As 
the Commentary notes, organized militia groups that are not fighting on behalf of a 
party to the conflict do not benefit from Article 4, but instead "the provisions of 
Article 3 relating to non-international conflicts are applicable, since such militias 
and volunteer corps are not entitled to style themselves a 'Party to the conflict."' 38 
This comment seems to explicitly recognize that geographically contiguous armed 
conflicts are indeed subject to legal bifurcation. 
The emphasis of connection to a State party is also manifest in the provision of 
Article 4 granting prisoner of war status to members of armed forces fighting on 
behalf of a belligerent State authori ty not recognized by an opponent State. Treat-
ment of such individuals apparently did not generate disagreement among the del-
egates to the drafting sessions, precisely because it was clear the belligerent conduct 
of such forces was conducted on behalf of a de facto State authori ty: 
At the Conference of Government Experts, delegations immediately approved the 
International Committee's proposal fo r a special clause to cover "members of armed 
forces claiming to be under an authority not recognized by the enemy.» It was feared, 
however, that the proposal might be open to abusive interpretation, and the 
Conference therefore decided to add that such forces must, in order to benefit by the 
Convention, be fighting "in conjunction" with a State recognized as a belligerent State 
by the enemy.39 
This express "in conjunction" language was removed in subsequent drafts, but 
only because it was clear that the situation that motivated the provision-the treat-
ment of forces fighting on behalf of the Free French authority during World War 
II- made it clear that the provision would only be applicable when the "in con-
junction" component was satisfied. Accordingly, the significance offighting on be-
half of a "State" remained the sine qua tlO1I for such application. 
Few experts would likely dispute the conclusion that fighting on behalf of a State 
party is a condition precedent to application of Article 4 of the GPW. However, 
what exactly does this mean? Unfortunately, the JCRC Commetltary provides vir-
tually no guidance, a likely result of the fact that the primary concern fo r the draft-
ers at the time Article 4 was revised was not this condition, but the fo ur "combatant 
qualification" conditions required by Article 4A(2). However, the lack of discus-
sion on this condition does not justify the conclusion that it has no substantive 
meanmg. 
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What does seem clear from the spirit and purpose of Article 4 is that the associa-
tion of an organized militia group to a State party must be more than merely inci-
dental. Simple geographic continuity of operations does not in itself seem to rise 
above the concept of incidental association, a fact implicitly acknowledged by the 
Commentary when it indicates that some militia groups might fall under the non-
international armed conflict legal regime. However, does a shared operational ob-
jective suffice to move beyond incidental association to the type of association re-
quired to trigger Article 4? In the opinion of this author, the answer is no. 
The "on behalf' of language used by the ICRC Commetltary to explain the 
meaning of article 4A(2) suggests more than a shared operational objective; it sug-
gests that the mili tia or volunteer group be seeking to achieve that objective for the 
primary purpose of contributing to the State's strategic objective. Thus, for a mili-
tia group to be operating "on behalf' of a State party, its operat ions must be 
"nested" within the strategic and operational objectives of the State and its regular 
armed forces. If the militia group is operating for the purpose of achieving its own 
independent strategic objectives, the mere fact that some of these objectives might 
be shared by the State party, or that the operational implementation of these dis-
tinct objectives leads the militia group to collaborate with the State party in tactical 
execution, does not warrant the conclusion that it is operating on behalf of the 
State. 
There is a legitimate argument that it was this latter type of linkage that defined 
the Taliban- al Qaida association in Afghanistan when the United States initiated 
operations against both these entities. There is no indication that al Qaida was sub-
ordinate to the Taliban in either a de jure or de facto sense. On the contrary, all in-
dicators suggest that al Qaida had established what could be characterized as a 
parasitic relationship with the Taliban-using the terri tory and resources offered 
by the Taliban to further its own independent strategic goals. In many ways, this re-
Oects a pelVerse inversion of the type of association envisioned by the drafters of 
the GPW. Instead of al Qaida militia operating under the command and control of 
the Taliban, Taliban forces were ostensibly subordinated to al Qaida command 
and control to selVe al Qaida interests.40 
It also seems dear that the events that caused the United States to target al Qaida 
with combat power-the terror attacks of September I I-were not conducted "on 
behalf' of Afghanistan. While it is undisputed that al Qaida had exploited the safe 
haven provided to it by the Taliban, this was at the time merely the latest base of op-
erations al Qaida had exploited.41 There is no evidence to indicate that al Qaida 
launched the terror attacks of September I I at the direction of the Taliban or to 
further some Taliban strategic objective. On the contrary, the independent nature 
of these attacks resulted in the destruction of the Taliban regime. 
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All of this supports the conclusion that the association between al Qaida and the 
State of Afghanistan was insufficient to support the presumption of Article 4 appli-
cability discussed above. If al Qaida initiated an armed attack on the United States 
as a distinct strategic objective, the mere fact that the military response to that at-
tack led the United States to engage in armed conflict with the State that provided 
safe haven to al Qaida does not necessarily justify the legal windfall of lodging the 
conflict with al Qaida within the realm of the international armed conflict against 
Afghanistan. 
The alternate conclusion is, of course, not without merit. It is certainly plausible 
that at least within the confines of Afghanistan, the conflict between the United 
States and al Qaida should be treated as derivative of the broader conflict between 
the United States and Afghanistan. But proponents of this theory should be re-
quired to muster more than mere geographic continuity, or even shared tactical 
objectives. The linkage between these two entities must reflect that al Qaida oper-
ated in a derivative capacity to the Taliban armed forces, for only such evidence can 
confirm the presumption that al Qaida was in fact operating "on behalf of' a party 
to the conflict. 
If al Qaida was not sufficiently connected to the Taliban in Afghanistan to qual-
ify as operating on behalf of a party to the conflict, then what was the nature of mil-
itary operations conducted by the United States against al Qaida forces in 
Afghanistan? As I have argued elsewhere and outlined above, the de facto conflict 
nature of such operations indicates that they should be considered to qualify as an 
armed conflict triggering the basic regulatory framework ofLOAC principles. Oth-
ers, however, argue that unless military operations against al Qaida fall within the 
broader context of an armed conflict with Afghanistan, such operations are noth-
ing more than extraterritorial law enforcement. It is to the fallacy of this proposi-
tion that this article will now tum. 
The Fallacy of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement as a Legal Model for 
Transnational Counterterrorism Military Operations 
One of the most difficult issues related to mili tary operations directed against 
transnational terrorist operatives (what I will refer to throughout this section as 
counterterror military operations) has been determining the appropriate legal 
framework applicable to such operations. Since the United States characterized its 
response to the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 as an "armed conflict," the 
well accepted standards for determining when the law of armed conflict is triggered 
have been thrown into disarray. In the years following that tragic attack, a variety of 
legal theories have been offered to identify the appropriate locus of such operations 
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within the international legal regulatory continuum. These have ranged from the 
US position that such operations are armed conflicts triggering LOAC-derived au-
thorities (althOUgh what type of anned conflict remains allusive), to the ICRC as-
sertion that such operations are merely derivative of international armed conflicts 
triggered whenever a State conducts military operations in the territory of another 
State, to the assertion of human rights organizations that these operations fall un-
der the human rights regulatory framework because armed conflict between States 
and transnational non-State entities is a legal impossibility. 
The skeptical reaction to the US assertion of a LOAC-based legal framework is 
unsurprising considering the breadth of that assertion typified by the hyperbolic 
characterization of a "Global War on Terror." But just as the nature of the military 
component of the international struggle against highly organized terrorist groups 
is much more refined than the broad concept of a "global war," so must be the 
analysis of which legal framework operates to regulate such military operations. 
Suggesting that the struggle against terrorism justifies invoking the "authorities of 
war" for every aspect of counterterrorism operations-from detaining a terrorist 
'"' foot soldier" on what is in all respects a conventional battlefield to capturing a ter-
rorist operative with law enforcement assets in the midst of a peaceful domestic en-
viron-is unjustifiably overbroad. But it is also unjustifiably under-inclusive to 
demand that military operations launched for the purpose of employing combat 
power against terrorist targets cannot be conducted pursuant to the LOAC legal 
framework because those operations fa il to satisfy a law-triggering paradigm 
that evolved with an almost exclusive focus on inter-State or intra-State armed 
conflicts. 
The stakes related to determining the applicable legal regime to regulate counter-
terror military operations are enormous. Not only do they have profound impact 
on the rights and liberties of individuals captured and detained in the course of 
such operations, but whether operations are conducted under the LOAC legal 
framework or under the alternate human rights framework fundamentally impacts 
the authority of State forces to employ combat power. Nor will pigeonholing every 
operation under the inter-State conflict framework always produce a logical result. 
While offering the benefit of application of the LOAC, such an approach-for ex-
ample, treating the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah as a subset of an 
armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon-results in what many consider to be 
an unjustified benefit for non-State forces, namely the opportunity to qualify for 
the privilege of combatant immunity. 
But determining the nature of an armed conflict is secondary to detennining the 
very existence of armed conflict. It is this issue-i.e., whether an armed conflict can 
even exist outside the inter-State/intra-State paradigm-that generates the most 
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fundamen tal debate related to the mili tary component of the fight against interna-
tional terror groups. For the United States, the answer is an unequivocal "yes." 
However, this in no way indicates a consensus on this issue; far from it . Instead, 
many experts in international law have insisted that such operations are not armed 
conflicts, but instead "extraterritorial law enforcement" operations. 
This alternate legal framework was recently emphasized by Professor Yoram 
Dinstein, certainly one of the international community's most respected jus belli 
scholars. During the conference which inspired this article, Professor Dinstein ar-
ticulated what he asserted was the clear and simple legal framework fo r the conduct 
of transnational counterterror military operations. According to Dinstein, such 
operations qualify as armed conflict under only two circumstances: firs t, when the 
operations are essentially derivative to an armed conflict with the State sponsor of 
the terrorist organization; second, when the actions of the terrorist organization 
can be attributed to a sponsoring State as the result of terrorist authori ty over or-
gans of the State. All o ther uses of force against such a threat must, according to 
Dinstein, be regarded as what he labels extraterritorial law enforcement. Accord-
ingly, he categorically rejected the proposition that such operations could amount 
to armed conflict. 
I will attempt the unenviable task of challenging the clarity and simplicity of 
Professor Dinstein's extraterritorial law enforcement theory. I will do so because I 
believe his conception of the legal characterization of counterterror military opera-
tions employing combat power is fundamentally inconsistent with the underlying 
nature of such operations. A far more important motive, however, is my convic-
tion that under appropriate circumstances treating such operations as events that 
trigger LOAC obligations is much more consistent with the logic, history and spirit 
of that law than attempting to characterize them as law enforcement missions. 
Context for this argument is critical. I do not suggest that there cannot be cer-
tain uses of the armed forces that do appropriately fall under a law enforcement le-
gal paradigm. Instead, the nature of military operations I will focus on involve the 
application of combat power by the armed forces against a designated target or 
group. For point of reference and clarity, the foc us of this article are those mili tary 
operations conducted by the armed forces against non -State actors operating out-
side the State's territory pursuant to what are essentially status-based rules of en-
gagement. If, as suggested above, operations conducted by the United States 
against al Qaida personnel in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom in Af-
ghanistan can legitimately be segregated from the broader armed conflict against 
the Taliban, they would fall into this category. Other examples include the 2007 US 
AC 130 strike against an alleged al Qaida base camp in Somalia and the Israeli cam-
paign against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon during the 1990s and again in 2006. 
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Determining the nature of such mili tary operations is central to the ongoing 
struggle against transnational terrorism. Past and future military operations con-
ducted to destroy, disable or disrupt the capabilities of such organizations have and 
will remain operationally and legally complex. More significantly, they will con-
tinue to strain the accepted construct for determining LOAC applicability. The 
depth of entrenchment of this construct no doubt explains Professor Dinstein's 
hostili ty to the suggestion that such operations could, under certain circumstances, 
qualify as armed conflicts for purposes of triggering LOAC obligations. However, 
any assessment of the controlling legal framework for these military operations 
must contemplate not only the "accepted" scope of the current law-triggering par-
adigm, but also the underlying purpose that motivated that paradigm. Perhaps of 
equal importance is the necessity to consider the second- and third-order conse-
quences of characterizing these operations as law enforcement. 
This section will therefore focus on the following factors that I believe are essen-
tial to any analysis of the legal framework for mili tary operations conducted against 
transnational terrorist operatives. These include the underlying nature and pur-
pose of the existing law-triggering paradigm; the relationship between the basic na-
ture of employment of combat power and the legal regime that should regulate that 
employment; how the nature of the authority invoked reveals a fundamental dis-
tinction between the authority derived from the law of armed conflict framework 
and that derived from the law enforcement framework; the importance of main-
taining a bright-line distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello; and 
the comparative feasibility of applying each framework to such operations. I be-
lieve these factors indicate that, contrary to Professor Dinstein's asser tion , relying 
on the LOAC framework to regulate these operations is not only more logical but 
more feasible than relying on a law enforcement legal framework. 
The Nature and PurpoU! of the Traditional LOAC-T riggering Paradigm 
All LOAC scholars and practitioners are versed in what I have previously character-
ized as the "either/or" law-triggering paradigm created by Common Articles 2 and 
3 of the four Geneva Conventions and the interpretation of these articles that 
evolved since 1949. This paradigm may have proved generally sufficient to address 
the types of armed conflicts occurring up until 9/ 1 I . However, this fac t no longer 
justifies the conclusion that no other triggering standard should be recognized. In-
stead, as the events since 9/ 11 have illustrated so convincingly, such recognition is 
essential in order to keep pace with the evolving nature of armed conflicts them-
selves. The prospect of an unregulated battlefield is simply unacceptable in the in -
ternational community, a fact demonstrated by the response to the conflict in 
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Lebanon.42 The ultimate question, therefore, is whether it is best to continue to try 
and fit the proverbial square "armed conflict" peg into the round "Common Arti-
de 3" hole, or whether the time has come to endorse a new category of armed con-
flict . It is the limited impact of Common Article 3 itself that compels the 
conclusion that recognizing a new law-triggering category is essential. 
Both the mili tary components of the US figh t against al Qaida and the recent 
conflict between Israel and Hezbollah have strained this traditionally understood 
LOAC-triggering paradigm.43 While this strain has produced international and na-
tional uncertainty as to the law that applies to such operations,44 it has also pro-
vided what may actually come to be appreciated as a beneficial reassessment of the 
trigger fo r application offundamental LOAC principles. As a result, the time is ripe 
to consider whether the pragmatic logic that has animated military policy on this 
subject for decades should not be regarded as something more, to wit a refl ection of 
a general principle of law requiring that all military operations involving the em-
ployment of combat power fall under the regulatory framework of the LOAC 
Before the United States Supreme Court issued its highly publicized ruling in 
the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,4S the Court of Appeals for the District of Col um-
bia ruled on Hamdan's challenge. In the judgment of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,46 Judge 
Williams articulated the logic motivating this reassessment in his concurring opin-
ion. In that opinion, he responded to the majority conclusion that Common Arti-
cle 3 did not apply to armed conflict with al Qaida because the President has 
determined that this conflict is one of international scope: 
Non-state actors cannot sign an international treaty. Nor is such an actor even a 
"Power" thaI would be eligible under Article 2 ( 3) to secure protection by complying 
with the Convention's requirements. Common Article 3 fills the gap, providing some 
minimal protection for such non·eligibles in an "armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." The gap 
being filled is the non-eligible party's failure to be a nation. Thus the words "not of an 
international character" are sensibly understood 10 refer to a conflict between a 
signatory nation and a non-state actor. The most obvious form of such a conflict is a 
civil war. But given the Convention's structure, the logical reading of "international 
character" is one that matches the basic derivation of the word "international," i.e., 
between "ations. Thus, I think the context compels the view that a conflict between a 
signatory and a non-state actor is a conflict "not of an international character." In such 
a conflict, the signatory is bound to Common Article 3's modest requirements of 
"humane" treatmenl and "the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples."47 
Although the logic expressed by Judge Williams seems pragmatically compel-
ling, his interpretation did not sway his peers. This reflected the influence of 
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Common Articles 2 and 3--and the legal paradigm they spawned-on conflict 
regulation analysis. But, as Judge Williams recognized, it is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the logic of the LOAC to disconnect the applicability of regulation 
fro m the necessity for regulation. Judge W illiams looked beyond the traditional in-
terpretation of Common Articles 2 and 3 because he recognized that what was 
needed was a pragmatic reconciliation of these two considerations. Ironically, it is 
the long-standing policy of the US military that validates this interpretation of the 
LOAC. That policy, as will be explained below, long ago rejected a formalistic inter-
pretation of applicability of LOAC principles to military operations in favor of a 
pragmatic application based on the necessity of providing US forces with a consis-
tent regulatory framework. 
Recognizing the Regulatory Gap: How Military Policies Reflect the Necessity of 
a "Principled" Approach to Military Operations 
The need to provide a LOAC-based regulatory framework for all combat opera-
tions, even those ostensibly falling outside the accepted law-triggering categories 
derived from Common Articles 2 and 3, is not something that critics of Israeli op-
erations targeting Hezbollah have only recently suggested. For more than three de-
cades prior to this conflict, the armed forces of the United States fo llowed a clear 
and simple mandate codified in the Department of Defense Law of War Program:48 
comply with the principles of the law of war during all military operations. While 
this policy mandate has never explicitly articulated what precisely is meant by 
"principJes,"49 this tenn is generally understood to refer to the concepts that reflect 
the fundamental balance between the dictates of military necessity50 and the obli-
gation to mitigate the suffering associated with armed conflict, concepts that pro-
vide the foundation fo r the more detailed rules that have evolved to implement 
these principles. This foundational principle/specific rule relationship is explained 
by Professor Adam Roberts: 
Although some of the law is immensely detailed, its foundational principles are simple: 
the wounded and sick, POWs and civilians are to be protected; military targets must be 
attacked in such a manner as to keep civilian casualties and damage to a minimwn; 
humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel must be respected; neutral or non-
belligerent states have certain rights and duties; and the use of certain weapons 
(including chemical weapons) is prohibited, as also are other means and methods of 
warfare that cause unnecessary suffering.51 
While the US Department of Defense has never explicitly defined the content of 
the term "principles," manuals for other armed forces do provide more clarity to 
199 
Making the Case for Conflict Bifurcation in Afghanistan 
the content of this term. For example, the recently revised United Kingdom Minis-
try of Defence Manual for the Law of Armed Conflict provides: 
Despite the codification of much customary law into treaty fonn during the last one 
hundred years. four fundamental principles still underlie the law of armed conflict. These 
are military necessity, humanity, distinction, and proportionality. The lawofarmed conflict 
is consistent with the economic and efficient use of force. It is intended to minimize the 
suffering caused by armed conflict rather than impede military efficiency. 52 
For US forces and their operations, the significance of the mandate to comply 
with these principles during all mili tary operations is not diminished by the ab-
sence of a precise definition of this term. Instead, definition is left to operational legal 
advisors based on their training and experience. What is significant for purposes of 
this article is that the policy requires that US anned forces treat any military opera-
tion, and especially any operation involving the use of combat power (armed con-
fli ct), as the trigger for application of a LOAC-based regulatory framework)3 This 
policy has provided the basis for following LOAC principles during every phase of 
the military component of what the Bush administration has characterized as the 
"Global War on Terror."S-4 
The motive for this policy was twofold. First, it was intended to provide a com-
mon standard of training and operational compliance during the range of military 
operations.55 Second, it responded to the reality that such operations are often ini-
tiated prior to a clear government determination of the legal applicability of the 
laws of war. 56 Ultimately, the armed forces value this policy because they intuitively 
understand that a framework for the execution of combat operations is essential to 
the preselVation of a disciplined force. This is a critically important purpose oflegal 
regulation of the battlefield, a consideration often overlooked by contemporary 
commentators. Although no longer commonly cited as a critical purpose of the 
LOAC, prior generations clearly understood this purpose. This is dearly evident by 
the emphasis of this purpose in one of the most important precursors to the twentieth-
century evolution of the conventional laws of war, the Oxford Manual of the LAws of 
War on LAnd:57 
By [codifying the rules of war derived from State practice[, it believes it is rendering a 
service to military men themselves ... . A positive set of rules, on the contrary, if they are 
judicious, serves the interests of belligerents and is far from hindering them, since by 
preventing the unchaining of passion and savage instincts-which battle always 
awakens, as much as it awakens courage and manlyvirtues,-it strengthens the discipline 
which is the strength of armies; it also ennobles their patriotic mission in the eyes of the 
soldiers by keeping them within the limits of respect due to the rights ofhumanity.S8 
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The compelling logic reflected in this extract finds contemporary manifestation 
in the policy mandates imposed on US and other armed forces that extend applica-
tion of these principles to all military operations. These mandates indicate that the 
application of combat power must always be subject to a basic regulatory frame-
work. The gap in the accepted scope oflegally required LOAC application, coupled 
with this logic, led other nations to follow the practice of imposing such regu1ation 
by policy.59 Even the United Nations, habitually called upon to use military forces 
in situations of uncertain legal classification, implemented an analogous mandate 
for forces operating under its control.60 However, no matter how logical such man-
dates may be in terms of military efficiency and humanitarian protections, their pol-
icy characters reveal a perceived gap between situations necessitating LOAC applica-
tion and the technical legal triggers for such application. Furthermore, their policy 
characters indicate that these mandates are ultimately subject to modification.61 
The historical underpinnings of the LOAC and the contemporary application of 
LOAC principles to a wide spectrum of military operations as a matter of national 
policy indicate that the dispositive factor in determining when this regu1atory 
framework should apply is the fundamental nature of the military operation in 
question. When armed forces conduct operations employing combat power 
against a defined enemy with authority to engage and subdue the enemy based 
solely on that defined status, such operations shou1d be regarded as armed con-
flicts. Because of this, the underlying logic that has driven the historical application 
of LOAC principles to regulate such operations provides compelling evidence in 
support of extending this framework to counterterror military operations that fall 
into this category, even when the enemy is a non-State entity with no plausible link 
of attribution to the State in which it operates. As will be discussed below, an ana-
lytical focus on the fundamental nature of the authority invoked by the State indi-
cates that the alternate proposition-to characterize such operations as law 
enforcement-is unsupported by any analogous logic. 
The Fundamental Distinction between the Law of Armed Conflict Legal 
Framework and the Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Legal Framework 
The discussion above reveals why the regu1atol)' framework applicable to military 
operations must respond to the de facto existence of armed conflict. However, it 
also reveals why the existing understanding of this law-triggering paradigm has op-
erated as an impediment to such application in any armed conflict not falling 
neatly within the inter-State/in tra-State conflict categories. As a result, military 
operations conducted by States against non-State operatives who operate trans-
nationally fall into a category of regu1atory uncertainty. In response to this 
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uncertainty, scholars like Professor Dinstein argue that such operations are best 
understood as extraterritorial law enforcement activities, and not as armed con-
flicts. This view presumably indicates that it is a law enforcement legal framework, 
and not LOAC principles, that functions to regulate such operations. 
This is a significant assertion, for it dictates a scope of authority that is arguably 
inconsistent with the fundamental nature and purpose of such military operations. 
It is undoubtedly true that the ultimate objective of disabling the operational capa-
bilities of terrorist organizations is the common purpose of any counterterror State 
action. However, the means by which law enforcement activities achieve this ob-
jective differs fundamentally from the means by which military operations do so, 
most significantly with regard to the use of deadly force. Indeed, the most funda-
mental distinction between law enforcement and armed conflict is manifested in 
the scope of use of deadly force authority-a distinction between use of deadly 
force as a last resort and use of deadly force as a first resort. Law enforcement activi-
ties, governed by international human-rights standards, reserve the use of deadly 
force as a measure of last resort. In contrast, use of deadly force against a military 
objective is a legitimate measure of first resort during armed conflict. 
This basic distinction between relative authorities reveals in the starkest manner 
the fundamental fallacy of characterizing military operations directed against 
transnational terrorists as law enforcement operations, not based on an analysis of 
the nature of authority associated with such operations, but merely on the basis of 
incompatibility with the inter-$tate/intra-State law-triggering paradigm. In most 
instances, the choice by the State to resort to military force against such a threat is 
driven by the assessed need to employ deadly force as a measure of first, and not 
last, resort. Consider the example of an airstrike conducted against a terrorist train-
ing facility operating with impunity in the territory of another State. It is incon-
ceivable that the authority to employ deadly force relied on by the air assets 
executing the mission will be contingent on a provocation from the terrorist target. 
Nor is it conceivable that the air assets will be obliged to offer the potential targets 
the opportunity to submit to apprehension as a condition precedent to the em-
ployment of combat power. Instead, the authority to employ that power will al-
most certainly be based on an inherent invocation of the principle of military 
objective, allowing the use of deadly combat power based solely on the identifica-
tion ofthe target as one falling into the category of a defined terrorist enemy. 
Employment of combat power under this type of authority is not law enforce-
ment. It is, quintessentially, a use of deadly force as a measure of first resort. The 
LOAC provides the only legal justification for such a use of force. Accordingly, 
based on the nature of the authority related to the military operation, armed con-
flict best characterizes the de facto nature of such activities, if for no other reason 
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than the State's implicit invocation of the principle of military objective as a justifi-
cation for the use of deadly force. Characterizing such operations as law enforce-
ment creates an immediate incongruity that undermines the fundamental nature 
of that characterization: the suggestion that the use of deadly force is limited to a 
measure of last resort and that less destructive means must be attempted prior to 
such use. 
No such incongruity would result from acknowledging that operations target-
ing terrorist operatives with combat power are armed conflicts. Instead, such ac-
knowledgment achieves a critical effect: the authority implici t1y invoked by the 
State is counterbalanced by the limiting humanitarian principles of this law. In 
short, if such operations are categorized as armed conflicts, the law essentially cre-
ates a "package deal" for participants. While the principle of military necessityl 
military objective may justify the employment of deadly force as a measure of first 
resort, other principles limiting the methods and means of warfare and establish-
ing baseline standards of treatment for captured and detained personnel also be-
come applicable. Unless combat operations conducted against terrorist operatives 
are understood to trigger this "package" of principles, States will contin ue to be 
free to adopt a selective invocation of the fundamental authority derived from the 
LOAC to take measures necessary to disable terrorist capabili ties, while disavowing 
legally mandated obligations derived from the same source oflaw.62 
The Bright-Line Distinction between the Jus ad Bellum and the Jus in Bello: 
Remembering That Application o/ the LOAC Should Not Be Influenced by 
Use 0/ Force Legality 
Another significant objection to treating military operations directed against 
transnational terrorists as triggering LOAC rights and obligations is that doing so 
will somehow legitimize such uses of force. This argument, however, ignores the 
historic bright-line distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. This 
distinction has long stood for the proposition that the legality of war must not be 
permitted to influence the applicabili ty of the rules for conduct during war. This 
distinction can genuinely be considered a fou ndational principle of the Geneva 
Conventions and the de facto law-tr iggering provisions incorporated therein. 
The ad bellumlin bello distinction is intended to achieve a cri tical effect: to en-
sure that the legal regime protecting the participants in armed conflict is not di-
luted or denied based on the choices of those who decide on armed conflict. It is a 
reflection of the basic tenet of the Geneva Conventions-all individuals impacted 
by armed conflict, civilian and warrior alike, are in essence "victims of war," for 
they are not responsible for the decision to wage war. Accordingly, the legal 
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regime that operates to limit the harmful effects of war on both warrior and civil-
ian must be triggered by a pure de facto standard: the existence of armed conflict. 
Of course, the primary concern at the time of the drafting of the Conventions 
was preventing States from using the illegality of war as a justificat ion for denial of 
humanitarian protections. The issue related to the application of the LOAC to mil-
itary operations between a State and non-State entity is quite the opposite. In this 
context, the concern is that acknowledging that such operations trigger the LOAC 
legal framework will bolster the legal justification for the use of force by the State. 
Nonetheless, the underlying purpose of the ad bellum/in bello distinction is equally 
applicable to this context and indicates that the legal framework that regulates the 
conduct of military operations should in no way influence the assessment of the le-
gali ty of those operations. 
As I have written extensively elsewhere, this de facto standard is a core concept 
of the existing law triggers of the Geneva Conventions. The focus of these triggers is 
on the question of actual hostilities that rise above the level oflawenforcement ac-
tivities. In such circumstances, the LOAC is the appropriate legal framework to 
achieve the humanitarian objective oflimiting unnecessary suffering. 
In the context of inter-State or intra-State hostilities, the line between a use of 
State power fo r law enforcement purposes and armed conflict has been relatively 
well defined. However, once States began to employ power outside their territo-
ries for the purpose of combating terrorism, this line became much blurrier. I 
(with my co-author Eric Jensen) have addressed the problem of defining the line 
between law enforcement and armed conflict in this extraterritorial context in a 
prior article, asserting that the nature of the use-of-force authority employed by 
armed forces is the most effective means of definition. It is not my purpose to ex-
pand upon that theory here. Instead, the basic concept reveals why the ad bellum/ 
in bello distinction is equally relevant in such a context. We argue that when a 
State authorizes the use of combat power based on an inherent invocation of the 
principle of military objective (in the form of status-based rules of engagement) 
a situation of de facto armed conflict exists. Even assuming that the use of force 
authorized by the State is in violation of the jus ad bellum, this in no way alters 
the basic reality that the State has implicitly invoked the LOAC fo r purposes of 
executing the operation. As a result, there is no justification to deprive the par-
ticipants in associated hostilities of the benefit of the fundamental principles of 
that law. 
What seems more appropriate, and certainly more consistent with the ad 
bellum/in bello distinction that is an integral element in detennining LOAC appli-
cability, is to treat the ad bellum/in bello issues as truly independent legal ques-
tions. Concluding a State's use of military force to target a terrorist entity is in 
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violation of the jus ad bellum but is nonetheless armed conflict triggering funda-
mental LOAC rights and obligations seems more satisfactory than asserting the 
jus ad bellum violation requires denying the participants in the hostilities the ben-
efits of the legal framework best suited to regulate such activities. 
Of course, characterizing such operations as law enforcement avoids this issue 
entirely. Or does it? It is unlikely that a State will not be held to account for armed 
interventions in the terri tory of other States simply because the State asserts it is ex-
ercising "extraterritorial law enforcement." And here lies the potential irony. In as-
sessing the jus ad bellum legality of State action, it is almost certain that the de facto 
nature of that action will be the focus, and not the characterizations adopted by the 
State. As a result, use of combat power under the rubric of extraterritorial law en-
forcement creates a double failure: it will be insufficient to avoid condemnation for 
a jus ad bellum violation, while at the same time it will deprive the forces engaged in 
the operation of the clarity provided by the legal framework developed to regulate 
the essential nature of their activities: armed conflict. 
The Law of Anned Conflict: A Defined and Intuitive Regulatory Framework 
As suggested above, the regulatory framework applicable to the conduct of military 
operations against transnational terrorist threats should not influence the assess-
ment of the legality of such operations. Accordingly, the primary analytical consid-
eration for determining which legal framework is most appropriate for the 
regulation of such operations is how effectively it achieves the regulatory purpose. 
It is here that applying LOAC principles offers substantial benefit over applying a 
law enforcement framework. This conclusion is supported by two primary consid-
erations. First, fundamental LOAC principles are well established and well under-
stood by professional armed forces. Indeed, these principles are so pervasive they 
have formed the foundation for policy regulation of many military operations that 
are not technically subject to the law. Second, because of this pervasive application, 
armed forces are well versed in compliance with these principles and as a result 
conducting operations pursuant thereto is relatively intuitive. 
This is not the case with the law enforcement framework. As a general proposi-
tion, armed forces are not trained to conduct law enforcement operations. Unlike 
their law enforcement counterparts, demanding a careful escalation of force to en-
sure that resort to deadly force is only a measure oflast resort is the exception to the 
mindset normally demanded of military personnel. That mindset requires the abil-
ity to engage an enemy with deadly combat power on command. This often in-
volves the application of overwhelming, and not graduated, combat power. 
Imposing a law enforcement framework on military personnel requires a radical 
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modification to the combat mentality, with all the training, planning and execu-
tion challenges associated therewith. 
Ironically, one of the common criticisms of the assertion that military opera-
tions against transnational terrorist groups trigger LOAC principles is the uncer-
tainty associated with determining what rules would apply to such operations. As 
Professor Dinstem noted during one presentation, "Where do the rules come 
from? Do you just make them up in a library in Texas?" There is, however, no 
need to "make up" any rules. Instead, as my co-author and I have noted else-
where, the fundamental LOAC principles-military necessity, military objective, 
proportionality and humanity-are well enough understood as to provide an ef-
fective starting point for the regulation of these military operations. Nor is ex-
tending these principles to transnational armed conflicts a radical suggestion, but 
instead a process analogous to that which has led to the development of the regu-
lation of internal armed conflicts (another point of particular irony, considering 
that Professor Dinstein has been central to the proposed application of regulatory 
provisions developed in the context of inter-State conflict to the realm of internal 
conflict). 
What seems particularly invalid about this criticism is that it seems even more 
legitimately leveled against the extraterri torial law enforcement theory. Unlike 
fundamen tal LOAC principles, there is no well established source of regulatory 
principles that apply to the use of military force for extraterritorial law enforce-
ment principles. If such operations are considered law enforcement, where do the 
rules that govern those operations come from? While rules applicable to domestic 
law enforcement activities are certainly well developed, there is no basis to assert 
that they can simply be transplanted to apply to extraterritorial military operations. 
Use oflaw enforcement would presumably be governed by the sending State's do-
mestic policing statutes, an odd choice of laws in an extraterritorial use of force. 
Accordingly, such a suggestion seems far more fabricated than applying LOAC 
principles to combat operations against terrorist operatives. In the latter situation, 
the armed forces would apply a body of rules that form the foundation of military 
training and operations and were developed to limit the harmful consequence of a 
State unleashing combat power. In the former, armed forces would be expected to 
comply with a regulatory framework that was never developed nor intended to ap-
ply to armed hostilities. 
Policy Application of the Law of Armed Conflict: Its Value and Limitations 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence in support of the validity of applying the 
LOAC framework to the type of military operations addressed in this article is that 
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reliance on this framework as a "default" standard has been the long-standing so-
lution to the legal uncertainties associated with contemporary military operations. 
For several decades, the armed fo rces of major military powers have imposed an 
obligation to comply with LOAC principles during all military operations, even 
when those principles were not applicable as a matter of law. This practice was ul-
timatelyemulated by the United Nations as a solution to the dilemma of establish-
ing a uniform regulatory standard for all UN forces engaged in peacekeeping 
operations. 
The logic behind this policy application ofLOAC principles reinforces the argu-
ment that the LOAC is better suited to provide for the regulation of counterterror 
military operations than the law enforcement framework. Military leaders have 
long understood that setting a LOAC-based default standard of regulation en-
hances the probability of disciplined operations by fac ilitating uniform training 
and planning criteria. Perhaps more important, because the LOAC is the only 
source of international law that evolved for the specific purpose of regulating mili-
tary operations, its extension to all military operations was understood as pragmat-
ically and operationally logical. In short, these policies indicate that military 
operat ions are best regulated by the law developed for such a purpose, and not by 
some artificial application of a body of law developed for an entirely different 
purpose. 
Indeed, the past effectiveness of this policy application of LOAC principles has 
led some to assert that there is no need to wade into the controversial waters of con-
fli ct characterization in relation to counterterror military operations, but that 
compliance with these policies provides an effective solution to the regulatol)' di-
lemma. But this argument is flawed for two reasons. First, it is in effect an acknowl-
edgment that these operations require the regulatory framework provided by the 
LOAC, with an effort to avoid the difficult question of why this framework should 
be applied. However, if the assumption is valid-that the nature of the operations 
requires LOAC regulation-then that issue must be addressed head on; and the 
reason for this is revealed in the second flaw of this argument. 
Until the US response to the terror attacks of September 11, the "policy is 
enough" argument held great merit. This was because issues related to the regula-
tion of military operations and treatment of individuals captured and detained 
during those operations were left almost exclusively to mili tary decisionmakers. 
However, it is widespread knowledge that this paradigm shifted dramatically after 
those attacks. No longer was the military free to "apply the principles of the law of 
war" with little or no interference from civilian policy- and decisionmakers. In-
stead, the intervention of these individuals exposed the limits of policy application 
of these principles. 
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In what are now regarded as notorious legal opinions, senior US government 
lawyers and the decisionmakers they advised adopted policies related to the treat-
ment of captured and detained personnel that deviated from the "principles" of 
the LOAC. The justification for these decisions was clear: unlike law, policy is mal-
leable. Accordingly, Department of Defense policy became ineffective once the 
leadership of the department or the nation chose to adopt inconsistent courses of 
action. This process exposed why simply asserting a policy-based application of 
LOAC principles to counterterror military operations is insufficient to address the 
regulatory issue. Participants in these endeavors-and the individuals they engage 
with combat power, subdue, capture and detain-require a legally defi ned and 
mandated regulatory framework. While the long-standing policies requiring com-
pliance with LOAC principles certainly indicate that these principles are the most 
logical and appropriate source of regulation for these operations, policy is ulti-
mately insufficient to provide this certainty. Only by acknowledging the legally 
mandated applicability of LOAC principles to such operations will this certainty 
be achieved. 
Case-by-Case Application and the Rejection of the Zero-Sum Game 
What I have attempted to do in this article is expose why it is invalid and disingenu-
ous to characterize counterterror military operations employing combat power 
under a "deadly force as a first resort" authority as extraterritorial law enforce-
ment. Instead, these operations should be treated as triggering the foundational 
principles of the LOAC. However, I am not suggesting a zero-sum game analysis-
that all uses of the military in the struggle against transnational terrorism must be 
characterized as triggering LOAC principles; far from it. What I have proposed 
here and previously is that the essential nature of the use-of-force authority related 
to any use of military power must dictate whether that use falls into the category of 
armed conflict or instead remains under the assistance-to-Iaw-enforcement cate-
gory. This may often be a difficult line to decipher. But rejecting the applicability of 
LOAC principles to those operations that cross this line simply because to do so de-
viates from the entrenched law-triggering paradigm seems to defy the underlying 
logic of the conventions that paradigm evolved from: a truly de facto law-triggering 
standard that ensured the assertion of authority derived from the LOAC required 
compliance with limiting principles of the same body of law. 
Acknowledging that under the appropriate circumstances armed forces are 
bound to comply with LOAC principles when conducting counterterror opera-
tions will not dilute the effectiveness of this law. It will instead ensure a balance of 
authori ty and obligation. Nor will it result in a parade ofhorribles because of the 
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uncertainty as to what rules apply to such operations. Applying the fundamental 
principles of the LOAC to such operations is a feasible first step for such regulation, 
and one with which many armed forces are familiar pursuant to the policy applica-
tion of these same principles that has been required for decades. Furthermore, any 
uncertainty as to the content of regulatory provisions derived from application of 
the LOAC is insignificant in comparison to the subjection of such operations to a 
law enforcement regulatory framework designed for a radically different purpose. 
Nor do I believe that such acknowledgment will increase the uses of combat 
power by States. While characterizing counterterror operations under the LOAC 
framework will undoubtedly trigger more expansive authorities than law enforce-
ment operations, requiring compliance with LOAC principles of constraint will 
limit the scope of that authority. Furthermore, there are other significant factors 
that will offset any tendency to treat such operations as armed conflict simply for 
the benefit of expanded authority. These include not only jus it! bello consider-
ations, which, when dealing with a terror target in anything other than a failed State 
are profound, but also domestic political considerations, international relations 
considerations and, perhaps most important, assessment of the most feasible 
means to achieve the neutralization objective. All that is suggested here is that 
when a State, after considering all these factors, chooses to unleash combat power 
to achieve the national objective, the benefit of the LOAC regulatory framework 
should not be denied simply because the enemy is a transnational organization 
without traditional military structure. 
Conclusion 
Conflict classification is the essential first step in determining the rights and obliga-
tions of parties involved in armed hostilities. For decades, this classification pro-
cess has been premised on the assumption that international law recognizes only 
two types of armed conflict: inter-State and intra-State. This led to the evolution of 
an "either/or" law-triggering paradigm: either the conflict was between two States, 
satisfying the triggering criteria of Common Article 2, or the conflict was between a 
State and a non-State armed entity within the territory of the State, satisfying the 
triggering criteria of Common Article 3. 
The increasing prevalence of extraterritorial military operations conducted by 
States against non-State armed organized groups has resulted in an assertion that 
such operations can qualify as armed conflicts. This theory oflaw applicability is 
exemplified by the US treatment of the struggle against al Qaida as an "armed con-
fli ct," a position dearly reflected in the Department of State enunciation excerpted 
at the beginning of this article. Although controversial, it seems undeniable that 
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this theory of what can be functionally characterized as "transnational" armed 
conflict is gaining legal momentum. 
The assumption that such a category of armed conflict can exist calls into ques-
tion the related asswnption that military operations conducted by the United 
States against al Qaida in Afghanistan could on1y be categorized as falling within 
the broader armed conflict against the Taliban. While such a unified armed conflict 
theory is certainly plausible, and concededly the presumptive position, it need not 
be the only position. Instead, a careful assessment of the relationship between al 
Qaida and the Taliban is necessary to determine whether such an outcome is justi-
fiable. If, as is suggested in this article, the facts reveal that al Qaida did not operate 
truly "'on behalf' of the Taliban, but instead had established more of a parasitic re-
lationship to serve its own independent strategic objectives, then this presumption 
becomes invalid. Such invalidity suggests that the conflict between al Qaida and the 
United States in Afghanistan can and should be characterized as distinct from the 
conflict between the United States and the Taliban. 
This conflict bifurcation leads to another inevitable question: are extraterrito-
rial counterterror operations armed conflicts? Or are they simply exercises of ex-
traterritorial law enforcement? Resolving this question and determining the 
most appropriate legal framework for the regulation of extraterri torial military 
operations directed against transnational terro r operatives is no easy task, but it is 
essential because of the increasing prevalence of such operatio ns. Since the 
United States began asserting it was engaged in an armed conflict with al Qaida, 
scholars, legal advisors, policymakers and courts have struggled with this ques-
tion, producing a wide variety of outcomes. Two major theories have evolved in 
response to th is quest ion. The first, epito mized by the US position, is that these 
operations qualify as "armed conflicts" within the meaning of international law, 
triggering a heretofore undefined package of legal authorities and obligations. 
The second is that armed conflict can only occur within the inter-State or intra-
State law-triggering paradigm established by Common Article 2 and Common 
Article 3, and that military operations can be considered "armed confli cts" only if 
they can be pigeonholed into one o f these categories. In all other cases, including 
the use of combat power to target terrorist operatives in the territory of another 
State, the military operations must be characterized as extraterritorial law en-
forcement activities, p resumably regulated by law enforcement authorities and 
human rights obligations. 
This article has asserted that this latter approach-rejecting the possibility of an 
armed conflict between a State and a transnational non-State entity-produces an 
illogical outcome disconnected from the underlying purpose of the LOAC. By es-
sentially pushing a square peg into a round hole, it unjustifiably denies the armed 
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forces and the people they encounter on what is indisputably a "battlefield" the 
benefit of the regulatory framework developed specifically to limit the harmful 
consequences produced when States unleash their combat power. While the overly 
broad reach ofLOAC authority resulting from the Bush administration's assertion 
of a "Global War on Terror" certainly justifies a cautious approach to the question 
of legal characterization, an under-inclusive backlash is equally invalid. 
What is necessary is a careful assessment of the fu ndamental nature of military 
operations on a case-by-case basis. When those operations are conducted pursuant 
to a "use of deadly force as a first resort" authority-normally revealed in the form 
of status-based rules of engagement-it indicates an inherent invocation of the au-
thority ofthe LOAC. Under such circumstances, armed forces must operate under 
the obligations established by the fundamental principles of the same body of law. 
These principles are generally well understood and have fonned the foundation for 
operational regulation of a multitude of military operations conducted by many 
armed forces for decades. Whatever uncertainty that may be inherent in these 
principles is relatively insignificant compared to the far more uncertain regulatory 
content of an extraterritorial law enforcement legal framework. What is much 
more problematic, however, is that military operations conducted pursuant to 
status-based rules of engagement are fundamentally inconsistent with a law en-
forcement legal framework, for the use of deadly force as a measure offirst resort is 
the quintessential nature-and in all likelihood purpose for-such operations. As 
such, it is the principles of the LOAC, and not those related to law enforcement ac-
tivi ties, that are most logically, pragmatically and appropriately suited for such 
operations. 
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the Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon Pursuant to Hwnan Rights Council Resolution 5·2/1, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/3/2 (Nov. 23, 2(06), available at hltp:llwww.ohchr.orglenglish/bodiesl 
hrcounciVdocsJspecialsessionlA.- HRC.3.2.pdf ("[ I] he hostilities that took place from 12 July to 
14 August 2006constitute an in ternational armed conflict to which conventional and customary 
international humanitarian law and international hwnan rights law are applicable"). 
45. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
46. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
47. Id. at 44 (Williams, Sr. Judge, concu rring). 
48. See Department of Defense, DoD Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program (1998). 
49. The p urported justification for this omission is that each subordinate service is then able 
to define the content of this tenn for purposes of its forces. Leaving definition of these principles 
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to the individual services creates obvious concerns of inconsistent practice. This concern is unac-
ceptable in the contemporary environment of joint operations. However, it is likely that a joint 
standard will be established by the Department of Defense in a Department of Defense Law of 
War Manual , which is currently under development. 
so. See UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL FOR THE LAw OF ARMED CONFUcr para. 
2.2 (2004) [hereinafter UK MANUAL] ("Military necessity permits a state engaged in an anned 
conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of anned 
conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the 
complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum 
expenditu re oflife and resources~ ) ; see also William Downey, The Law of War and Military Ne-
cessity, 47 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 251 (1953). 
51. International Middle East Media Center & Agencies, United Nations Official: Israeli 
Bombardment of ubanon Violates Humanitarian Law, IMEMC NEWS, July 23, 2006, http:// 
www.imemc.orgJindex.php?option =com_content&task=view&id=20260&ltemid= 173. 
52. See UK MANUAL, supra note 50, para. 2.1 (emphasis added). The manual also provides 
an extensive definition of these principles. 
53. See Department of Defense, DoD Directive 2311.01 E, DoD Law of War Program (2006) 
(hereinafter Directive 2311.01 E]. The exact language is " It is DoD policy that: Members of the 
DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts 
are characterized, and in all other operations." Id., para. 4.1; seealS() Timothy E. Bullman, A Dan-
gerous Guessing Game Disguised as an Enlightened Po/icy: Untied States Laws of War Obligations 
DuringMilitary Operations Other T/um War, 159 MIUTARY LAw REVIEW 152 (1999) (analyzing 
the potential that the US law of war policy could be asserted as evidence of a customary norm of 
international law). 
Other armed forces have implemented analogous policy statements. For example, the 
German policy to apply the principles of the law of war to any anned conflict, no matter how 
characterized, was cited by the ICTY in the Tadic jurisdictional appeal as evidence of a general 
principle of law extending application of the law of war principles derived from treaties 
governing international armed conflict to the realm of internal armed conflict. See Tadic, supra 
note 29, para. 118 (citing HUMANITARFS VOLKERRECHT IN BEWAFFNETEN KONFUk'TEN-
HANDBUCH 211, DSK AV207320065 ( 1992)[hereinafter German Mil itary Manual of 1992[); 
reprinted in 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATE.RIALS 32 1(1996); see also Bullman, A Dangerous 
Guessing Game, supra. 
This policy has recently been updated, and has been made even more emphatic by omitting 
the "principles~ qualifier to require compliance with the law of war during all military 
operations. According to the most recent version: " It is DoD policy that: Members of the 000 
Components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such confliclS are 
characterized, and in all other mil itary operations.~ Directive 2311.01£, supra, para. 4. 
54. This term wiU be used throughout this article as a convenient reference for the variety of 
military operations conducted by the United States subsequent to September II, 200 I. Use of 
this tenn is not intended as a re flection on this author's position on the legitimacy of characteriz-
ing these operations as a "war. ~ While the author acknowledges the hyperbolic nature of this 
term, it is intended to refer to combat military operations against anned and organized opposi-
tion groups. 
55. Interview with W. Hays Parks, a senior attorney for the Defense Department and recog-
nized expert on the law of armed conflict. Parks is the chair of the Department of Defense Law of 
War Working Group, and one of the original proponents of the Law of War Program. 
216 
Geoffrey S. Com 
56. For example, the uncertainty related to the application of the laws of war to Operation 
Just Cause in Panama is reflected in the following excerpt from a Department of State submis· 
sion related to judicial determination of General Noriega's status: ~(Tlhe United States has made 
no formal decision wi th regard to whether or not General Noriega and former members of the 
PDF charged with pre-capture offenses are prisoners of war, but has stated that each will be pro· 
vided all prisoner of war protections afforded by the law of war." See Gov't Resp. to Def. Post· 
Hearing Memo. of Law, Sept. 29, 1992, at 8, cited in United States Y. Noriega, 808 F. Supp . 791 
(S.D. Aa. 1992). 
In Somalia, although US forces engaged in in tense combat operations against non-State 
organized armed militia groups (see MARK BoWDEN, BLACK HAWK DoWN: A STORY OF MODERN 
WAR (1999), there was never a fonnal detennination of the status of the conOict. See 
Memorandum from lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, Commander, Unified Task Force 
Somalia, to All Subordinate Unified Task Force Commanders, Subj: Detainee Policy (Feb. 9, 
1993). 
57. INSTlnITE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND (1880), availllbleat 
http://www.icrc.orglihl.nsflFULUI40?OpenDocument. 
58. [d., Preface. 
59. See Prosecutor y. Tadic, Case No.IT -94-I-AR72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 118 (Oct. 
2,1995), reprinted in 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIAlS 32 (1996) (citing the German Mil i· 
tary Manual of 1992, the relevant provision of which is translated as follows: ~Members of the 
German army, like their Allies, shall comply with the rules of international humanitarian law in 
the conduct of military operations in all armed conflicts, whatever the natlll"e of such conflicts." 
German Mil itary Manual of 1992); see also UK Manual, supra note 50. para. 14.10 (which indio 
cates that during what it defmes as "Peace Support Operations" -military operations that do 
not legally trigger application of the law of armed conflict-~Nevertheless, such fighting does 
not take place in a legal vacuum. Q uite apart from the fact that it is governed by national law and 
the relevant provisions of the rules of engagement, the principles and sp irit of the law o f anned 
conflict remain relevant"). 
60. In 1999, the Secretary-General of the Uni ted Nations issued a bulletin titled "Observance 
by Uni ted Nations forces of international h umanitarian law." This bulletin mandated compli. 
ance with foundational principles of the law of war (international humanitarian law) d uring any 
operation that q ual ified as an "armed conflict." No characterization qual ification was included, 
and the application paragraph demonstrates an extremely expansive interpretation of the con· 
cept of armed conflict to which such principles apply: 
Section I 
FieJd of application 
1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humani tarian law set o ut in 
the present bulletin are applicable to Uni ted Nations forces when in si tuations of armed 
conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the 
d uration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, 
or in peacekeeping operations when the use of fo rce is permitted in self-defence. 
UN Secretary-General, Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations forces of in ternational 
humanitarian law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, reprinted in 38 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
MA TERlAlS 1656 (1999) . 
61. See Noriega, supra note 56 (indicating that a policy-based application of the laws of war 
is insufficient to protect the rights of General Noriega because it is subject to modification at any 
time at the will of the executive) . 
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62. A brief comment here about what some scholars have characterized as "mil itarized" law 
enforcemenl. Pursuant to this theory, the overarching legal framework for extraterritorial 
counterterror operations is best defined as a one derived from law enforcement authorities; but 
under certain circumstances when the use of combat power to augment law enforcement capa· 
bilities is required, the presumptive law enforcement activity would be considered Kmilitarized." 
This theory seems to be consistent with the thesis of this article, if it suggests that when lawen· 
forcement activi ties become Kmilitarized," that ratcheting up of means brings into effect a differ· 
entlegal framework, namely LOAC principles. If, however, the suggestion is that when a State 
Kmilitarizes" law enforcement activities, the armed forces engaged in operations are bound to 
comply with a law enfon:ement legal framework, then it seems that the effectiveness of the 
"militarization" of the activity would be disabled due to an incongruous operational authority 
equation. 
One middle ground that might also be suggested by this concept is that anned forces would 
be regulated by LOAC principles during the operational phase of "militarized" law enforcement, 
but that individuals captured and detained, once removed from the area of immediate conflict, 
would be subject to a law enforcement legal regime. Such a hybrid approach seems responsive to 
the primary objection leveled against the US invocation ofLOAC authorities vis-a.-vis captured 
terrorists-namely their indefinite detention without trial on the basis of military necessity. It 
also seems to accommodate the needs of the armed forces engaged in such operations by providing 
them with the most logical legal framework during those operations. One other potentially 
significant benefit of such a hybrid approach is that it would eliminate any incentive for an 
unjustified invocation of LOAC authority as a subterfuge for avoiding nonnal legal process 
related to detention. 
It does, however, seem difficult to dispute the logic of detaining an individual who has acted in 
what is for all intents and purposes a belligerent capacity against a State. The legitimacy of this 
"militarized~ law enforcement theory rests on the assumption that existing domestic legal 
authority for the trial and incapacitation of such an individual will satisfy the necessity of 
preventing a return to belligerent activities. If this assumption is valid, then the hybrid approach 
holds great merit . If, however, the assumption is invalid, it seems inconsistent with a LOAC· 
based authority that led to the capture of such an individual to require release with full 
knowledge of a likely return to belligerent activities. 
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